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Of What Difference?
Reflections on the Judgment and Abortion
in Canada Today
On January 25, 2008, in Toronto, Ontario,
the Faculty of Law, University of Toronto
(U of T) and the National Abortion
Federation (NAF) co-hosted an
interdisciplinary symposium to celebrate
the 20-year anniversary of Regina v.
Morgentaler, the Supreme Court case in
which the criminal law on abortion in
Canada was held unconstitutional.
The symposium brought together more
than 100 participants, from legal scholars,
abortion providers and journalists

to representatives from government
and women’s advocacy organizations.
Examining abortion from a variety of
perspectives, participants addressed the
significance of the event and the difference
the R. v. Morgentaler judgment has since
made to women, providers and the politics
of abortion in Canada.
This reader, prepared in collaboration with
the Women’s Health Research Institute, is
a compilation of the day’s presentations at
this commemorative legal conference.
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Better Never Than Late, But Why?
The Contradictory Relationship Between Law and Abortion
Shelley A. M. Gavigan, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University
I am honoured to have been invited to be
a panelist in such distinguished company
at this important event. I am particularly
attracted to the invitation in the title of
the Symposium to reflect upon the 1988
decision of the Supreme Court of Canada
in R. v. Morgentaler.26 In reflecting upon
the case, its significance and legacy, I want
to talk about the importance of history,
the contradictory nature of law and the
enduring importance of ideology.
I take this liberty of insisting upon the
importance of historical experience and
perspective and I do so because I am of the
view that it is due entirely to my historical,
as opposed to current, engagement with the
critically important issues of abortion and
law that I have been honoured with this
invitation.

Reflections on the Importance
of History
I was reminded recently of the importance
of history and how quickly something
“becomes” history by my own lapse in
precision: I asked my research assistant
to pull the Supreme Court’s Morgentaler
decision for me, which she dutifully did:
the Supreme Court’s R v Morgentaler
1993 decision.27 Of course, this was my
fault—I had not been clear enough. But
it then occurred to me that my smart
feminist research assistant may not have
known there had been other, indeed, a
few other, Morgentaler decisions.28 To my
feminist colleagues in the academy I ask,
are we confident that we are teaching
26
27
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[1988] 1 S.C.R. 30; [1988] SCJ No. 1.
R v. Morgentaler [1993] 3 S.C.R. 463
e.g. Morgentaler v The Queen (1975) 30 C.R.N.S
209.

this generation of law students about this
decision and its importance? One has
to hope that they are not relying on the
mainstream media for their introduction—
or misinformation—about the Morgentaler
case? Clearly this Symposium is an
important event, intended as it is to reinsert abortion and reproductive rights on
our collective agendae.
I was speaking last week about today’s
Symposium to a friend who graduated
from Law School in 1989. She said her time
at law school was marked by preoccupation
with the issue of abortion law and that
for her and women law students of her
generation, the 1988 Morgentaler decision
was a defining moment of victory. I
remember it so well, and so personally.
On the early evening of January 28, 1988,
almost two weeks after our daughter’s first
birthday celebration, we had bundled her
into her stroller and joined hundreds of
kindred spirits in a spontaneous rally in
front of the then still standing Morgentaler
clinic on Harbord Street in Toronto to
celebrate the decision of the Supreme Court  
historic decision. Women, abortion and
law had become the issue around which
I politicized when I embraced feminism
in my twenties, to the great chagrin of
my Irish Roman Catholic father and my
French Roman Catholic mother who was a
maternity ward nurse. For the next twenty
years my political and academic work
focused on abortion. As a law student in
a seminar on Advanced Administrative
Law, I tried to research the processes
and practices of therapeutic abortion
committees in Saskatchewan hospitals. This
proved to be difficult research, as it was
nigh unto impossible to find any working
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committees. Like many Canadian feminists
of my class and generation, I marched in
countless International Women’s Day and
pro-choice demonstrations. Who can forget
how cold our feet got in those frosty March
8 marches on Women’s Day before the
arrival of global warming? We marched and
carried signs that demanded the state get
its laws off our bodies, repeal abortion law
and drop the charges, again and again and
again.
I studied the legal history and context of the
criminalization of English abortion law, the
genesis of the statutory prohibition in 1803,
the demise of the relevance of quickening
and the ousting of the jury of matrons, and
the extension of the criminal law’s scope
over the entire period of pregnancy.29 I
studied the issue of the criminal liability
of the non-pregnant woman attempting
the self-induce a miscarriage of a nonexisting pregnancy which took me into the
snakes and ladders of the law of impossible
attempts. But, there was not much ‘action’
in the criminal cases—one encountered
abortion in criminal legal history
principally in homicide, where a woman
had died, and her lover, friend, doctor,
midwife was prosecuted for willful murder.
When I turned to social history and
women’s history, I found a different story.
Indeed, it was in the course of this research
that I learned my most profound political
and intellectual lessons: to appreciate the
importance of women’s agency and selfdetermination, and the ways in which in
the abortion context they had defied the
law and medical men: I found the voices
of women who said to doctors, “Nonsense,
doctor, there is no life yet…” and “Doctor, I
do not believe it is a crime.”30
29
30
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Shelley Gavigan, “The Criminal Sanction as it
Relates to Human Reproduction” (1984) 5 J.
see Shelley A.M. Gavigan, The Abortion Prohibition
and the Liability of Women: Historical Development
and Future Prospects (Master of Laws thesis,
Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, 1984)
at 96-97. See also, Shelley A.M. Gavigan, “‘On

The historical record of coercive and
restrictive abortion law in the AngloCanadian context is filled with relatively
few criminal prosecutions and far more
expression of women’s resistance. One
need think no further in our recent history
than of an ordinary young woman, Chantal
Daigle, thrust unwillingly into the national
news in 1989 when her former boyfriend
attempted to prevent her from terminating
her pregnancy—neither the first nor last
man to attempt to do so, neither the first
nor last man to fail in the Canadian courts.31
During that summer, under the watchful
eyes of an entire nation, Daigle resisted
her former boyfriend, the Canadian antichoice movement, the courts, among
others. Daigle reminded us that “women’s
individual and collective struggles for
choice and self-determination may have
been constrained, but have never been
wholly confined nor determined by the
legal and judicial processes.”32

The Contradictory Nature of Law
It was also in this work into the social
and legal history of abortion that I began
to develop an understanding of the
contradictory nature of law, including
criminal law, and what I later characterized
as the “fragile, incomplete and
contradictory” nature of legal victories,33
including the decision we are invited to
reflect upon today. As but one illustration,

31
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bringing on the menses’: The Criminal Liability
of Women and the Therapeutic Exception in
Canadian Abortion Law” (1986) 1 C.J.W.L. 279.
Daigle v. Tremblay [1989] 2 S.C.R. 530; for
earlier unsuccessful ‘father’s rights’ injunction
applications in Canada, see Whalley v. Whalley et al
(1981), 122 D.L.R. (3d) 717 (B.C.Co.Ct); Medhurst
v. Medhurst et al (1984), 9 D.L.R. 252 (Ont.H.Ct.).
For a later one, see Murphy v. Dodd (1999), 63
D.L.R. (4th) 515 (Ont.H.Ct.).
Shelley A.M. Gavigan, “Morgentaler and Beyond:
Abortion, Reproduction and the Courts” in
Janine Brodie, Shelley A.M. Gavigan and Jane
Jenson, The Politics of Abortion (Toronto: Oxford
University Press, 1992) 117 at 146.
Ibid.

the 1969 introduction of the therapeutic
exception in the Canadian criminal
code had at least one surely unintended
consequence; in casting abortion as a
medical matter, the law inhibited husbands
who went to court—prior to 1988—to
attempt to prevent their wives from
terminating their pregnancies.34 This is one
small instance, in my view, of the law not
only mediating but inhibiting patriarchal
relations. In many ways, the legal history
of abortion taught me most of what I ever
learned about women, law and the state,
about law and patriarchal relations, and
law’s contribution to social change.

campaigns, days of action, struggles to get
the sisters in the early days of National
Association of Women and the Law to take
a pro-choice position—I hope I will be
indulged for saying simply that after years
of struggle—reading Chief Justice Dickson’s
and Madam Justice Wilson’s words made
one a bit lightheaded:

But back to the evening in January
twenty years ago—as we left the rally on
Harbord Street and walked back to our
car, we encountered a small, disgruntled,
venomous group of anti-choice women.
Looking at the baby in the stroller, they
hurled an epithet at us, one that embodied
all the contradiction and hatefulness of
their self-proclaimed pro-life stance: “Why
didn’t you abort that one?” I had never
doubted their commitment to life was
confined to the invisible and unborn, but in
that moment I came to appreciate that their
hatred and disrespect for women extended
to living and breathing children.

Theoretically, I take the view that law is a
social form in and through which social
relations are mediated and expressed. But
with respect to abortion, I look outside
the law to civil society. I do acknowledge
legal abortions tend to be safer than illegal
abortions. And so I am not agnostic about
the efficacy of legality and its importance
as a foundation for safety and access—it is
most assuredly a necessary but insufficient
precondition.

The historic Morgentaler decision was
but the first of many legal defeats their
movement would experience in Canadian
courts. But, the experience of the last
twenty years suggests their defeats at the
hands of the law have not been fatal. As I
have suggested elsewhere, it takes more
than “feeble law reform and litigation” to
defeat patriarchal institutions, practices and
relations.
I am happy to leave close analysis of
the Supreme Court decision to the
Constitutional scholars. Suffice it to observe
that as a feminist activist and veteran
of marches, all-candidates meetings,
34

E.g. Medhurst, supra note 7.

Forcing a woman, by threat of criminal
sanction, to carry a foetus to term unless
she meets certain criteria unrelated to
her own priorities and aspirations, is a
profound interference with a woman’s
body and thus a violation of her security
of the person.35

In the area of abortion, Canadian women
have experienced many legal victories in
Canadian courts, some by the skin of their
teeth, some at the hands of judges who are
more grudging than others, with dissents
that give cause for alarm.

The Importance of Ideology
It is now axiomatic to observe the Supreme
Court’s 1988 decision resolved some
questions but left many more dangling—
tantalizing and inviting to the opponents of
women’s right to choose. For instance, the
precise nature and expression of what all
judges of the Supreme Court characterized
as the “state’s interest in the foetus”
remained to be elaborated and tested.

35

Morgentaler (1988), supra note 4 at 408.
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imagination and tap the anxiety of people
who are receptive to the notion that
pregnant women are capable of extreme
acts of selfishness and irresponsibility.
The foetus is presented as helpless and
vulnerable, the most innocent of innocent
victims. Again, what is striking is that
this campaign has been so successful
without significant support in Canadian
law for its fundamental underlying
premise: that the foetus is a person with
legal rights.40

Long-time anti-choice renegade, Joe
Borowski, had been granted standing
by the Supreme Court in 1981 to bring
an action challenging the validity of the
therapeutic abortion amendments to the
Criminal Code in the name of foetal legal
personhood.36 He lost the foot race with
Morgentaler to the Supreme Court, and by
the time he reached the Court, the abortion
section of the Code had been struck down,
and his appeal was dismissed as moot.37
Still, the discourse of the ‘unborn child’
began to appear in the judgments, and
is now ubiquitous, even as the Courts
resisted the claims advanced in favour
of foetal legal personhood and so-called
father’s rights.38 Having lost the legal fight
in the context of criminal law and access
to abortion, anti-choice advocates looked
to other legal forms, such as child welfare,
to advance their cause. In 1996, they found
what they surely believed to be the poster
child for foetal rights in the pregnancy of
a poor pregnant woman addicted to glue,
who had lost three children to child welfare
apprehension, and who refused to stop and
refused treatment.39
The child welfare agency sought a
declaration that the superior court’s
inherent parens patriae jurisdiction over
children extended to “unborn children.”
And they lost, taking comfort from a
dissent by Justice Major that my Children
and the Law students thought was right on.
In 1992, I wrote,
The potential cultural and political
successes of the foetal rights movement…
lie in its ability to both capture the
36
37
38
39
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Borowski v. Minister of Justice of Canada and
Minister of Finance of Canada (1982), 39 N.R. 331
(S.C.C.).
Borowski v. Canada (Attorney General), [1989] 1
S.C.R. 342 (S.C.C).
e.g. R. v. Sullivan, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 489; see also
Daigle v Tremblay, Murphy v Dodd, supra note 7.
Winnipeg Child and Family Services (Northwest
Area) v. G. (D.F), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 925.

But, as Rosalind Pollack Petchesky argued
with prescience in the American context,41
the legalization of abortion contributed
to the ascendance of an aggressive antiabortion movement, one that has continued
to organize in the churches and religious
schools. Their discourse of the unborn child
has become a dominant ideology of our
time. Their ability to present all pregnant
women as risky, possibly irresponsible,
always potentially hostile to their own
pregnancies, has in my view become
pervasive and I believe socially shared. So,
rather than speak of maternal mortality,
or of women’s inherent dignity, of the
complexity of the abortion decision, never
not a complex decision, never an easy
choice,42 or of sexual coercion, they assert
only a chorus of the unborn child in a selfimpregnated woman.

40
41
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Gavigan, supra note 8 at 132.
Rosalind Pollack Petchesky Abortion and a
Woman’s Choice: The State, Sexuality and
Reproductive Freedom (Boston: Northeastern
University Press, 1985).
See Wilson J. in Morgentaler (1988), supra note
2 at para 242: The decision is one that will have
profound psychological, economic and social
consequences for the pregnant woman. The
circumstances giving rise to it can be complex
and varied and there may be, and usually are,
powerful considerations militating in opposite
directions. It is a decision that deeply reflects
the way the woman thinks about herself and her
relationship to others and to society at large. It is
not just

The law is implicated in the ideology of the
unborn child, but it seems to me that some
of its currency and legitimacy derives from
its opposition to the law—as a form that
needs to be protected, and the law is not
doing that. I take the view that ideologies
become dominant not necessarily through
law and occasionally in opposition to
law, but emergent as well as dominant
ideologies may nonetheless be imported or
incorporated into law. When I last wrote
about abortion fifteen years ago (hence my
commitment to an historical perspective
today), I wrote that the strongest weapon
in the arsenal of the anti-choice movement
had not yet proven to be a legal one—and I
continue to hold that view.
I am mindful that the Symposium’s
dedicated organizer, Dawn Fowler, would
have liked me to discuss the dilemma of
the dearth of availability of late trimester
abortions in Canada—and this I have not
done. But I do want to make the point that
ideologues like David Frum43 attempt to
cultivate in the national imagination that
late trimester abortions are a ubiquitous
menace, a direct legacy from Madam
Justice Wilson’s courageous reminder of the
limits of men to be able to respond—‘even
imaginatively’—to something so out of
his personal experience.44 It is difficult to
discern even a kernel of truth in David
Frum’s construction of the crisis– for the
world is truly upside down through his
lens. The image of the scourge of late
trimester abortion could not be further from
the truth, and yet it is asserted as truth.
Increasingly, I believe we must situate
the struggle of Canadian women within

43

44

a medical decision: it is a profound social and
ethical one as well. Her response to it will be the
response of the whole person.
David Frum, “The Morgentaler Decision
Cheapened the Worth of Human Life” http://
network.nationalpost.com/np/blogs/fullcomment/
archive/2008/01/21/david-frum-the-morgentalerdecision-cheapened-the-worth-of-human-life.
aspx.
Wilson J, in Morgentaler (1988) supra note 2.

the broader context of women around the
world who are struggling under adverse
conditions to deal with unintended
pregnancies. A recent study by Gilda
Sedgh and her colleagues, published in
Lancet,45 found that 48 per cent of all
abortions worldwide were unsafe and
that 97 per cent of all unsafe abortions
were in developing countries—so many
of the world’s women have access only
to unsafe abortions, if they have access
at all. I am neither a Constitutional Law
nor International Law scholar. Currently I
am interested in legal history of criminal
law, but I know something of the historic
struggle of women to control their fertility
against the odds of men, medicine the
state, the law and religion. Is it at all
surprising that women have always had
to resist and challenge their relegation to
social invisibility as moral agents? But
feminists have long known that there are
no easy victories,46 certainly not in the area
of reproductive health, and we have the
expertise in this area, in this room, starting
with the person sitting next to me.
I do struggle with how to engage with
the dominant ideology of the unborn
child. But there are some lessons that can
be drawn from historical reflection. For
me, it is important to remember the most
meaningful victories, especially those
derived from law, need to be extended
and experienced outside the four corners
of the courtrooms, and celebrated beyond
feminist circles, especially feminist legal
45
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Gilda Sedgh, et al, “Induced Abortion: Estimated
Rates and Trends Worldwide” (2007) 370 Lancet
1338 at 1342 (www.thelancet.com). Unsafe
abortions are defined as “Abortions done either
by people lacking the necessary skills or in any
environment that does not conform to minimum
or medical standards, or both. These include
(a) abortions in countries where the law is
restrictive and (b) abortions that do not meet legal
requirements in countries where the law is not
restrictive” (at 1339).
Kathleen McDonnell, Not An Easy Choice: A
Feminist Re-Examines Abortion (Toronto: The
Women’s Press, 1984).
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circles. For twenty years prior, leading up
to the Morgentaler decision, women activists
and their allies made abortion a public,
political issue in Canada, starting with the
Abortion Caravan in 1969. Dr. Morgentaler
lent his name, his professional reputation,
his career and indeed his life to the support
of this important campaign. But it was
never just about the law. It was about and
for Canadian women.
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In closing, my last thought is this—if
we acknowledge the current ascendant
discourse is one of the unborn child, then
we as feminists and supporters of choice
for women must re-insert the women in the
social vernacular, and start again from the
premise that the pregnant woman and the
unborn child speak with one voice, and that
voice is hers.

